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Abstract—The visualization of future generation Wireless 
Communication Network (WCN) redirects the presumption of 
onward innovations, the fulfillment of user demands in the form 
of high data rates, energy efficiency, low latency, and long-range 
services. To content these demands, various technologies such as 
massive MIMO (Multiple Input Multiple Output), UDN (Ultra 
Dense Network), spectrum sharing, D2D (Device to Device) 
communication were improvised in the next generation WCN. In 
comparison to previous technologies, these technologies exhibit 
flat architecture, the involvement of clouds in the network, 
centralized architecture incorporating small cells which creates 
vulnerable breaches initiating menaces to the security of the 
network. The half-duplex attack is another threat to the WCN, 
where the resource spoofing mechanism is attained in the 
downlink phase of D2D communication. Instead of triggering an 
attack on both uplink and downlink, solely downlink is targeted 
by the attacker. This scheme allows the reduced failed attempt 
rate of the attacker as compared to the conventional attacks. The 
analysis is determined on the basis of Poisson’s distribution to 
determine the probability of failed attempts of half duplex attack 
in contrast to a full duplex attack.  
Index Terms—half duplex attack, failed attempt rate, D2D, 
WCN, security, Poisson’s process. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Research on security occupies the vital aspect of WCN. 
Various security issues were revealed from preceding years 
though security attacks on WCN is an approaching advent that 
requires immense attention. Based on the fundamentals of 
security, security attacks can be characterized as attacks on 
identity protection, location privacy, communication 
confidentiality, availability, authorization, and authentication  
[1]. Some of the attacks that are closely associated with 5G 
(Fifth Generation) WCN include bandwidth spoofing, IP 
(Internet Protocol) spoofing, pilot contamination attack, rouge 
access point attack, signaling storms, ping flood, radius 
cracking [2]. D2D communication defines the shortest 
communication between device nodes without any requirement 
to pass across the core network or access point [3]. The 
operations involved in D2D communication are self-managing 
and spontaneous. Therefore, complete security adaptability is 
still its challenging aspect in comparison to the security 
provided by the centralized cellular network [4].  
II. STATE OF THE ART 
D2D allows the devices to perform communication with 
each other independently, devoid of network infrastructure. It 
leverages several vulnerable security threats such as physical 
attacks, compromised credentials, configuration attacks, 
protocol attacks, and privacy attacks [4]. Possible security 
attacks in D2D communication include proximity based attack 
[5], free-riding attack, inference attack, trust forging attack, 
impersonation, location spoofing, data fabrication attack, and 
DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) [6], fake profile attacks 
[7]. These attacks target both downlink and uplink to execute 
the operation. To deteriorate the rate of intrusion detection, one 
of the probable is the execution of the Half-Duplex (HD) 
attack.  
A. Contribution 
      This paper proposes an attack based on the downlink solely. 
The energy efficiency, probability of failed attempts, and failed 
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Fig. 1. (a) Phase of AN forwarding (b) Phase of continuous requests (c) Phase of resource spoofing
 
III. RESEARCH PROPOSAL 
      This proposal integrates Half Duplex (HD) attack on the 
relay device of the D2D pair. These devices are comparatively 
less secure as compared to other communication identities. HD 
attack scenario involves the D2D communication with device 
relaying controlled link assisted by BS (Base Station). It 
encompasses the triggering of an attack on downlink 
specifically. It is observed that HD attack occupies more 
probability to occur with more sensitivity and less complexity 
as compared to conventional Full Duplex (FD) attacks.  
A. System model 
Consider a device node 𝐵 present the edge of the cell where the 
coverage of the reception is comparatively weak. Following the 
advantage of D2D backed communication, another device node 
𝐴 present in the reachable zone of signal from the BS. Thereby, 
device 𝐴 acts as a relay, and BS is liable to allocate resources 
to the devices. Assume the D2D communication takes place in 
the presence of an intruder with an unknown CSI (Channel 
State Information). HD attack comprises of three phases, and 
each phase is diagrammatically shown in Fig. 1. These phases 
can be defined as: 
1) The phase of AN (Artificial Noise) forwarding  
It involves the intrusion of AN by the intruder 𝐼 to the device 
node 𝐵 present at the boundary of the cell. The purpose of 
incurring AN to device 𝐵 is to create noise during the D2D 
communication phase such that artificially generated noise is 
transmitted along with the information signal, as shown in Fig. 
1(a). Thereby creating the interference effect on the device 𝐵.  
2) The phase of continuous requests  
The second stage involves the continuous transmission of 
requests for the availability of resources to form a D2D pair at 
the device 𝐴 by the intruder 𝐼, as shown in Fig. 1.(b). The main 
objective of this phase is to drain the resources of the device 𝐴 
and make it unavailable for the downlink phase of resource 
allocation. The mechanism is incorporated after the 
transmission of authentication request by the device A to the 
BS. The continuous procedure of repeated requests to the 
device 𝐴 results in the failure of its availability. It is followed 
by the response of the device A to the intruder.  
3) The phase of resource spoofing 
It involves the response attained by an intruder from the BS 
intended for the valid device 𝐴 as shown in Fig. 1(c). The phase 
involves the masquerading the identification of valid device 𝐴 
by the intruder 𝐼 such that intruder receives the information 
present in the downlink from BS to the intruder. Therefore, 
takes hold of the allocated resources, which were meant to be 
allocated to the legitimate device 𝐴. The HD attack is evaluated 
by the parameter of failed attempt probability. Let 𝑥1
𝑛 as the 
total number of attempts made by the intruder to attack the 
device-A, 𝜙 as the mean of 𝑥1
𝑛, 𝑤𝑑𝑙
𝐻𝐷 and 𝑤𝑟
𝐹𝐷  as the number of 
failed attempts to access resource allocation in HD attack and 
FD attack such that the Failed Attempt Rate (FAR) for the HD 
attack, 𝑊𝑟
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𝑛                             (3) 
For the HD attack, the number of failed attempts to receive the 
downlink successfully are defined for downlink only. Let the 
number of the failed attempts in the downlink in HD attack be 
equal to the number of failed attempts in the downlink in FD 













𝐻𝐷                           (5) 
Where 𝑤𝑢𝑙
𝐹𝐷 , 𝑤𝑑𝑙
𝐹𝐷are the number of attempts in uplink and 




𝑛  is a non-negative 
quantity whose value lies between 0 and 1. Therefore, form 
equation (5) it can be concluded as: 
𝑊𝑟
𝐹𝐷 ≥ 𝑊𝑟




𝑛 ≥ 0        (6) 
Equation (6) justifies the analysis that the FAR achieved in the 
FD attack is more than the FAR obtained in HD attack. Then 
the probability of the random variable characterized by the 
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Probability of failed attempts for downlink in full duplex attack 
is assumed to be equal to the probability of failed attempts for 
downlink in HD attack, such that the probability of failed 
attempts in FD attack can be expressed as: 
𝑃(𝑤𝑟
𝐹𝐷 ; 𝜙) = 𝑃(𝑤𝑢𝑙
𝐹𝐷; 𝜙) + 𝑃(𝑤𝑑𝑙
𝐻𝐷; 𝜙) − 𝑃(𝑤𝑢𝑙
𝐹𝐷; 𝜙) ∩ 𝑃(𝑤𝑑𝑙
𝐻𝐷; 𝜙)         
(9) 
The occurrence of each attempt is independent at each time 
interval such that 𝑃(𝑤𝑢𝑙
𝐹𝐷; 𝜙) and 𝑃(𝑤𝑑𝑙
𝐻𝐷; 𝜙) are mutually 
exclusive. 
Therefore,              𝑃(𝑤𝑢𝑙
𝐹𝐷; 𝜙) ∩ 𝑃(𝑤𝑑𝑙
𝐻𝐷; 𝜙) = 0                           (10) 
Using equation (10) in equation (9), we get 
𝑃(𝑤𝑟
𝐹𝐷 ; 𝜙) = 𝑃(𝑤𝑢𝑙
𝐹𝐷; 𝜙) + 𝑃(𝑤𝑑𝑙
𝐻𝐷; 𝜙)                      (11) 
The probability of failed attempts in full duplex attack is less 
than the probability of failed attempts in HD attack given by: 
𝑃(𝑤𝑟
𝐹𝐷 ; 𝜙) ≥ 𝑃(𝑤𝑑𝑙
𝐻𝐷; 𝜙)   ∀ 𝑃(𝑤𝑢𝑙
𝐹𝐷; 𝜙) ≥ 0             (12) 
The equation (12) identifies that the failed attempt probability 
of the FD attack under the impact of AD is always greater than 
the probability of the failed attempts in HD attack. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Failed attempt rate versus number of attempts 
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS 
In this section, simulation results are elaborated in the 
MATLAB simulation environment, and the conclusions 
attained are being stated for half-duplex attack and full-duplex 
attack. The simulation parameter involves the bandwidth of 
800MHz and the user distance of 150m to 250m from the base 
station. Fig. 2. demonstrates the results of FAR concerning the 
number of attempts for the half-duplex and full-duplex attack. 
From the graphical examination of Fig. 2, it is analyzed that 
FAR shows an approximate linear behavior with respect to the 
number of attempts taken to attack the device. Moreover, high 
FAR for FD attack is observed as compared to the HD attack 
for an increasing number of attempts. In Fig. 3, it is detected 
that the probability of occurrence of failed attempts is more in 
FD attack than in HD attack. It is also perceived that the 
probability of failed attempts increases with an increase in a 
number of failed attempts initially and from the maximum 
probability, it decreases with an increase in the failed attempts 
representing the bell-shaped curve characteristics. The results 
of probability are obtained by using Poisson’s distribution, as 
mentioned in equation (7) and (8). Fig. 4 represents the energy 
efficiency analysis of HD and FD attack in the urban and rural 
scenarios. It is illustrated that in both scenarios of rural and 
urban communication network HD attack is more energy-
efficient than the FD attack. Furthermore, HD attack in rural 
scenario occupies more energy efficiency than in urban 
scenario. Therefore, it can be concluded that the HD attack is 
predicted to be more effective than an FD attack. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, possible attack strength is explored, wherein 
solely downlink is targeted in the form of an HD attack. The 
proposed attack is compared with the FD attack involving both 
uplink and downlink. This approach defines the security 
perspective of attacking attempts in an HD mode and in FD 
mode. In HD mode, the attempt of spoofing the resources 
meant to be allocated to the legitimate user is allocated to the 
intruder instead. The probability of occurrence of failed 
attempts in HD attack is reflected to be less and 
correspondingly strengthening the successful attacking 
attempts as compared to the FD attack. The phases of the 
attacking strategy in HD mode are explained 
Fig. 3. Probability of failed attempts versus number of exactly occurring 
attempts
Fig. 4. Energy Efficiency versus Distance for HD (Half-Duplex) attack ad FD 
(Full Duplex) attack under rural and urban scenarios 
schematically. Further, the simulation results are implicated, 
demonstrating the effectiveness of the HD attack in comparison 
to the FD attack. It is reflected from the parameter analysis of 
energy efficiency, FAR, and the probability of false attempts 
the proposed attack is more effectual than the FD attack. 
REFERENCES  
[1]  Rupprecht, D., Dabrowski, A., Holz, T., Weippl, E., & Pöpper, C. 
(2018). On security research towards future mobile network 
generations. IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 20(3), 2518-
2542. 
[2]  Gupta, A., Jha, R. K., Gandotra, P., & Jain, S. (2017). Bandwidth 
spoofing and intrusion detection system for multistage 5G wireless 
communication network. IEEE Transactions on Vehicular 
Technology, 67(1), 618-632 
[3]  Shen, W., Yin, B., Cao, X., Cai, L. X., & Cheng, Y. (2016). Secure 
device-to-device communications over WiFi direct. IEEE 
Network, 30(5), 4-9. 
[4]  Haus, M., Waqas, M., Ding, A. Y., Li, Y., Tarkoma, S., & Ott, J. (2017). 
Security and privacy in device-to-device (D2D) communication: A 
review. IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 19(2), 1054-1079 
[5]  Xu, J., Chen, L., Liu, K., & Shen, C. (2018). Designing Security-Aware 
Incentives for Computation Offloading via Device-to-Device 
Communication, IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 17 
(9), 6053-6066. 
[6]  Gandotra, P., Jha, R. K., & Jain, S. (2017). A survey on device-to-device 
(D2D) communication: Architecture and security issues. Journal of 
Network and Computer Applications, 78, 9-29. 
[7] Sun, J., Zhang, R., & Zhang, Y. (2016). Privacy-preserving 
spatiotemporal matching for secure device-to-device 
communications. IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 3(6), 1048-1060. 
